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Abstract 
Researchers find weaknesses in current strategies for 
protecting privacy in large datasets: many 
‘anonymized’ datasets are re-identifiable, and norms 
for offering data subjects notice and consent over-
emphasize individual responsibility. Based on fieldwork 
with data managers in the City of Seattle, I identify 
ways that these conventional approaches break down in 
practice. Drawing on work from theorists in 
sociocultural anthropology, I propose that a Human-
Centered Data Science move beyond concepts like 
dataset identifiability and sensitivity toward a broader 
ontology of who is implicated by a dataset, and new 
ways of anticipating how data can be combined and 
used. 
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Introduction 
Data science researchers commonly navigate a 
particular tension between an ethical mandate to 
protect their participants’ privacy, and, where 
necessary, to preserve the richness of granular 
datasets. Conventional approaches to managing privacy 
include (1) de-identification, (2) notice and consent, 
and (3) collection limitation, and (4) obfuscation.  In 
this paper, I draw on fieldwork with the City of Seattle 
to point to ways that these approaches cannot protect 
individual privacy from threats like re-identification and 
inferential analysis. Then, I suggest new directions for 
addressing data privacy. 
This paper draws on 6 months of fieldwork, including 
24 interviews across seven departments in the City of 
Seattle between January-May 2015, we explored the 
ways that municipal data managers consider privacy in 
their collection, management, and release of data [1]. 
These questions are especially salient in the 
Washington state context, where the WA Public Records 
Act (Ch. 42.56 RCW) provides for all public records to 
become available in response to a public disclosure 
request, subject to few limitations. In this paper, I 
develop insights from our work on municipal data into 
considerations for researchers in a Human-Centered 
Data Science.  
Datasets can be more or less identifiable to a particular 
data subject, an individual contained within the 
dataset. They can also be more or less sensitive, as 
defined by a potential for privacy harm, depending on 
the nature of the data [2]. As a starting point for this 
paper, I contend that the conceptual schema of 
‘identifiability’ and ‘sensitivity’ no longer serve us, given 
the changing realities about how data can be re-
identified or used to make inferences about groups. 
Data de-identification is defined by the removal of 
personally identifiable information (PII), for example, 
name and address fields. Seemingly innocuous de-
identified records can be tied together in an operation 
called a ‘join;’ an operation for combining datasets by 
connecting their common attributes. Seminal work by 
Latanya Sweeney and others has demonstrated the 
removal of PII method is still vulnerable to re-
identification by correlating details from a dataset with 
publicly available, identified data [3]. Ohm, Felten and 
Naranayan state that there is no evidence that de-
identification works to protect privacy or anonymity in 
practice [4] [5]. In our research, we conducted joins 
across datasets on Seattle’s already-open municipal 
data, in order to demonstrate that this was true of open 
municipal data as well. 
A second, widely-held approach to preserving privacy is 
to follow principles set forth by the Federal Trade 
Commission, called the Fair Information & Privacy 
Practices (FIPPS, or metonymically, ‘notice and 
consent’).  Under FIPPS guidelines, data subjects must 
be notified at the time that data is gathered about 
them, briefed about the uses to which data will be put, 
and asked to consent. FIPPS provide data subjects the 
ability to opt-in or opt out of inclusion in a dataset. 
Perhaps because of the difficulty of following FIPPS in 
practice, it is sometimes raised as a ‘gold standard’ for 
maintaining data subject privacy [6]. However, scholars 
have also raised doubts about the extent to which 
‘notice and consent’ can protect privacy in a meaningful 
way, because it places too much responsibility on the 
user’s ability to decide. It does not account for the 
  
staggering number of requests that would require 
consent, or the users’ cognitive overload that would 
result [7]. In our research with the City of Seattle, we 
recommended that municipal data follow ‘notice and 
consent’ guidelines. However, this was perceived as 
infeasible for the scale and complexity of the city’s data 
practices. 
One of the FIPPs, collection limitation, is itself a 
strategy to protect privacy. In our work in Seattle, we 
observed value tensions around collection limitations. 
Rich, detailed data was valuable for reasonable 
purposes, for example, studies on traffic volume and 
commute time in the Department of Transportation. 
Where high-resolution data like location traces were a 
liability, the city depended on private contractors to 
handle the raw data and return aggregated statistics.  
In practice, one strategy we observed was to ‘collect 
first, aggregate later,’ such that very sensitive data was 
being collected, and then distilled or discarded as the 
data circulated between the sensor, vendor, and city 
departments. Thus, collection limitation by the city 
does not always result in collection limitation by all 
relevant actors. This presents a privacy risk in that any 
data that is collected can be re-circulated or spilled.  
Researchers have proposed other methods for 
protecting data. Foremost among these is the 
differential privacy approach: instead of having access 
to all disaggregated records, differential privacy 
requires queries to a protected database [8]. Results 
from the queries use sophisticated statistical techniques 
to shield individuals within the dataset, by producing 
statistically consistent noise [8]. Whereas differential 
privacy offers an approach for institutional adoption, 
Nissenbaum and Brunton call on us as individuals to 
deliberately obfuscate our own data trails, as a weapon 
to counter asymmetry in the ways their data can be 
stored and used [9].   
In the following prompts, I offer several directions for a 
Human-Centered Data Science to move beyond these 
conventional approaches as a means for protecting data 
privacy.  
1. Hacks, obfuscation, and ‘folk data practices’  
In her seminal essay, ‘Can the subaltern speak?’ 
Gayatri Spivak draws attention to the way that 
members of relatively oppressed groups are 
homogenized into a single category and ‘spoken for’ 
[10]. Inspired by Spivak, a Human-Centered Data 
Science might interrogate the way our categories as 
researchers are constructed. We may scaffold our 
practice with critical questions about who is included in 
the data and who isn’t. How can we design datasets 
that preserve multiplicities of experience, instead of 
flattening them along a set of spectra? Inspired by 
Spivak’s vision, a Human-Centered Data Science may 
begin to open up inquiries into ‘folk data practices,’ or 
trace ways that data subjects thwart attempts to have 
data collected about them. How does a notion like 
obtaining user ‘consent’ assume that users are 
empowered to give it, or that it will be heard in the 
form in which they express (or withhold) it? 
2. From individual to collective data subjects 
As Cate notes, conventional approaches to preserving 
online privacy puts the burden on individuals and their 
choices [11]. Similarly, in large datasets, we might ask 
how the idea of protecting privacy is focused around 
the idea of individual privacy. Real-world examples 
point to ways that companies have leveraged data 
  
about users in neighborhoods [12], racial groups [13], 
and type of hardware [14]. By thinking of privacy as 
applying to places, identities and things, we can begin 
to break down received notions of privacy violations as 
only occurring on an individual level. A Human-
Centered Data Science may develop ways to anticipate 
these other scales of impact, to include race and social 
justice implications of datasets. 
3. The political economy of datasets 
In our research with the City of Seattle, we found that 
leaders of the open data initiative wanted to realize 
latent value in the data for local community members 
and local enterprise. Conspicuously absent from their 
concept of who uses open data was the data brokerage 
industry. Data brokers aggregate, index, and sell data 
to advertisers; a recent FTC report found that the 
majority of data brokers studied relied on open 
government data [15]. A Human-Centered Data 
Science will create venues to discuss the markets that 
datasets enter as they are collected, managed and 
released. It will offer computational social scientists 
ways to anticipate unintended users of large-scale data, 
and ask questions about who benefits from it, and who 
is liable for it.  
4. Disciplinary power and user exposure  
Our current approaches to privacy can sometimes 
flatten our ethical vision—somewhat like digital image 
compression making an image blurry and low-
resolution. For example, under FIPPS, data accuracy is 
an ethical standard; FIPPS encourages data holders to 
create means by which data subjects can correct and 
update their entries. The hope is that inaccurate data 
will not be used to data subjects’ detriment, as in the 
prospect of being denied credit. However, while 
inaccurate data may harm users, so too may accurate 
data. James C. Scott argues that accurate data, like a 
census, makes data subjects legible and amenable to 
control [16]. This example shows us that considering 
ethics within a dataset may not always boil down to 
whether data is accurate, or whether data subjects may 
update their information. We may instead ask questions 
about what activities a dataset makes possible. By 
closing the loop, and bringing the answers to these 
questions back to the data collection stage, a Human-
Centered Data Science can offer researchers a set of 
tools for anticipating and remediating ethical issues 
latent in a research dataset.   
5. A typology of open data  
When data is made ‘open,’ how is it opened? On what 
platforms is it hosted, and in what formats is it made 
available? Who can read these formats, and on what 
machines? The word ‘open’ obscures the answers to 
these questions, by presenting multiple forms of 
openness as a single heading, and valorizing it. In our 
fieldwork with the City of Seattle, we observed 
mounting pressures behind opening data for 
government transparency, from the enforcement of 
public records laws to campaigns by activists. The local 
community using the data, however, found that 
geospatial data was often released in expensive 
proprietary formats, making it unusable to them. A 
Human-Centered Data Science would be an appropriate 
community for scholarship that interrogates values 
behind open data initiatives. It may also offer new ways 
of categorizing openness, so that researchers working 
with large datasets might no longer refer to ‘open’ data 
as an undifferentiated whole, but as a set of choices 
with respect to platforms, formats, licensing, and uses. 
  
Based on fieldwork in Seattle, and drawing on 
sociocultural anthropological theory, I have suggested 
that that Human-Centered Data Science can go beyond 
existing approaches to protecting individual privacy in 
large-datasets in the following ways: (1) attend to 
hacks, obfuscation and ‘folk’ data practices, (2) move 
from individual to collective data subjects, (3) analyze 
the political economy of datasets, (4) examine 
disciplinary power and user exposure, and (5) create a 
typology of open data. 
 
References 
1. Whittington, J., Calo, R., Simon, M., Woo, J., 
Young, M., & Schmiedeskamp, P. (Forthcoming). 
Push, Pull, and Spill: A Transdisciplinary Case 
Study in Municipal Open Government. Berkeley 
Technology Law Journal, Vol. 
2. Calo, M. Ryan. “Boundaries of Privacy Harm, The.” 
Ind. LJ 86 (2011): 1131. 
3. Sweeney, L. (1997). Weaving technology and 
policy together to maintain confidentiality. The 
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 25(2-3), 98-110. 
4. Narayanan, A., & Felten, E. W. (2014). No silver 
bullet: De-identification still doesn’t work. White 
Paper. 
5. Ohm, P. (2010). Broken promises of privacy: 
Responding to the surprising failure of 
anonymization. UCLA Law Review, 57, 1701. 
6. University of California, Berkeley, Office of the 
Chancellor, Ethics and Compliance Program. Fair 
Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) Privacy 
Course. 
<https://ethics.berkeley.edu/privacy/fipps>. 
7. Solove, D. J. (2012). Introduction: Privacy self-
management and the consent dilemma. Harv. L. 
Rev., 126, 1880. 
8. Dwork, C. (2011). Differential privacy. In 
Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security (pp. 
338-340). Springer US. 
9. Brunton, F., & Nissenbaum, H. (2013). Political and 
ethical perspectives on data obfuscation. Privacy, 
Due Process and the Computational Turn: The 
Philosophy of Law Meets the Philosophy of 
Technology, 164-188. 
10. Spivak, G. C. (1988). Can the subaltern speak? 
11. Cate, F. H. (2006). The failure of fair information 
practice principles. Consumer protection in the age 
of the information economy. 
12. Moynihan, T. (2015) “Apps snoop your location way 
more than you think.” < 
http://www.wired.com/2015/03/apps-snoop-
location-way-think/>. Wired, March 25, 2015. 
13. Sweeney, L. (2013). Discrimination in online ad 
delivery. Queue, 11(3), 10. 
14. “On Orbitz, Mac Users Steered Toward Pricier 
Hotels.” < 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023
04458604577488822667325882>. 
15. Federal Trade Commission. (2014). Data brokers: 
A call for transparency and accountability. 
16. Scott, J. C. (1998). Seeing like a state: How certain 
schemes to improve the human condition have 
failed. Yale University Press. 
 
